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REcENT CASES
since it indicated the clear intention of the board summarily to dis-
miss the claim, and held the action of the board to be erroneous. The
court of appeals, on the other hand, has looked at the technical form
of the board's action and has invalidated the action taken by the
circuit court. The net effect is that the board must now go through
the formality of issuing a final order which on appeal will be in-
validated.
The interval between the initial assignment to the referee and the
decision of the court of appeals was three years.6 A similar time
lapse presumably is now attending the review of the erroneous final
order. Still another period of delay very likely will accompany the
ultimate review on the merits. It is submitted that substantive treat-
ment of the board's ruling could have reduced these detrimental
delays by one, while the technical treatment given the ruling by the
court of appeals unnecessarily postpones the possibility of recovery
by the injured workman and clutters the court docket with repetitious
review of what is essentially one issue.
T. R. Fitzgerald
ANTrTRUST LAw-APPLICATION OF THE SHERMAN ACr, SECION ONE, TO
BANK MEac~ms.-The First National Bank and Trust Company and the
Security Trust Company, both of Lexington, Ky., after receiving
authorization from the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to the
Bank Merger Act,' consolidated2 to form the First Security National
Bank and Trust Company. Suit based on sections one3 and two4 of
6 Creech v. Roberts, supra note 4, at 734.
112 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1960). It seems to be settled that Congress did not
intend by its enactment of the Bank Merger Act to supersede the provisions of
the Sherman Act in any respect. Approval by the Comptroller of the Currency
does not immunize the plan from attack by the Justice Department. California
v. Federal Power Commission, 369 U.S. 482 (1962); United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963); United States v. First National Bank &
Trust Co., 208 F. Supp. 457, 458 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
2 There is a recognized distinction between "merger" and "consolidation"
as applied to corporations. In a "merger," one corporation absorbs the other but
remains in existence, while the other is dissolved. In a "consolidation" a new
corporation is created and the consolidating corporations are extinguished. Personal
Credit Plan v. Kling, 20 A.2d 704, 706 (N.J. 1941). In the Philadelphia National
Bank case, the "merger" was technically a "consolidation" and thus it is a moot
question whether the rule of law of that case covers true mergers. In the First
National Bank case, although the district court referred to the plan as a consolida-
tion or merger, it is implicit that the plan was in fact a consolidation.
315 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). This section provides in part: "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal."
4 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
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the Sherman Act was filed against the plan of consolidation by the
Justice Department; the district court found that no violation of the
Act was shown.5 Appeal was taken to the United States Supreme
Court. Held: Reversed. The elimination of competition between two
major competitors in the relevant commercial and geographical mar-
ket 6 constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of sec-
tion one of the Sherman Act. United States v. First National Bank and
Trust Co., 84 Sup. Ct. 1033 (1964).
Justice Harlan wrote a strong dissenting opinion in which ie
labeled the decision of the majority as both "doomed to be a novelty
in the reports" and "the vehicle for turning the clock back to antitrust
days of long past."7 These aphorisms are accurate criticism of the
peculiar aspects of the majority opinion-the unique relationship to
the Philadelphia National Bank case,8 and the revival of an antiquated
and discredited line of authority.
The First National Bank case must be considered a novelty in the
reports as it is rendered, ab initio, of little value in bank-consolidation
cases by the decision of United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,
handed down by the Court during the period after the initiation of
suit in the First National Bank case but before the final determination
of that action. The Philadelphia National Bank case, on similar facts,
held section seven of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950,9 applicable
to bank consolidations. As the 1950 amendment to section seven
excepted from coverage assets acquisitions by corporations not subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission, and as banks
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC, the Philadelphia Na-
5 United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 208 F. Supp. 457(E.D. Ky. 1962).6 The relevant commercial market was considered to be commercial banking;
the relevant geographical market was considered to be Fayette County, Ky.
United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 84 Sup. Ct. 1033, 1034(1964). To ascertain the relevant market it is necessary to consider the actual
competition to which the defendants are subject, and the reasonable inter-
changeability of the goods or services offered by the defendant with similar goods
or services. United States v. E.I. DuPont Co., 851 U.S. 877, 404 (1956); Report
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-Trust Laws 44-48(1955).
7 United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 84 Sup. Ct. 1033, 1088
(1964).
8 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 874 U.S. 321 (1963).
9 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). This section provides in relevant part: "No corpora-
tion engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
[Vol. 52,
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tional Bank case is most startling on its face, and perhaps the tortuous
reasoning' ° of that case may explain why the Justice Department
instigated an action based on the Sherman Act during the pendency
of its Clayton Act case. Now that it has been determined that the
Clayton Act is applicable to bank consolidations, the Sherman Act
should be of receding importance. Under the Clayton Act, the Gov-
ernment satisfies the burden of proof when it shows that the con-
solidating corporations are both thriving, are in inter se competition,
and that the consolidated corporation will have an unduly large share
of the relevant market.' The Clayton Act is used as a prophylactic
measure to stop anti-competitive tendencies in their incipiency; the
test is one of per se illegality, without reference to motive or the
strength of remaining competition. 2
On the other hand, where a consolidation, either vertical or hori-
zontal, is challenged under the Sherman Act, the Government is
compelled to prove a real threat to the remaining competition by
showing that the consolidation will have the effect of restraining trade.
The case of United States v. Columbia Steel Co.13 is the modem
keystone of this aspect of section one of the Sherman Act. In that
case, the Court rejected per se illegality as applied to vertical and
horizontal integration and outlined a factor approach to require an
inquiry into the economic realities of every individual case.
We look [the Court said] rather to the percentage of business controlled,
the strength of the remaining competition, whether the action springs
from business requirements or purpose to monopolize, the probable
development of the industry, consumer demands, and other character-
istics of the market. We do not undertake to prescribe any set of
percentage figures by which to measure the reasonableness of a
corporation's enlargement of its activities by the purchase of the assets
of a competitor. The relative effect of percentage command varies with
the setting in which that factor is placed.' 4
The Columbia Steel case received mixed comment' 5 and served in
'o Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, was forced to argue that the stock-
acquisition and assets-acquisition provisions read together reach mergers; and
that, since banks are exempt only from the assets-acquisition provision and since
immunity from the antitrust laws is not to be lightly implied, bank mergers are
subject to section seven. See The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 Harv. L. Rev.
62, 160 (1963).
"lBrown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-28 (1962); United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank, supra note 8, at 363.2Ibid.
13334 U.S. 495 (1948).
14 United States v. Columbia Steel Co. 334 U S 495, 527-8 (1948).15 See generally: Zlinkoff and Barnard, Mergers and the Anti-Trust Law, 97
U. Pa. L. Rev. 151, 175 (1948); The Columbia Steel Case: New Light on Old
Antitrust Problems, 58 Yale L.L. 764, 773 (1949).
1964]
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part to instigate the 1950 amendment to the Clayton Act, 6 by which
it was sought to extend the preventative justice of the newer law to
assets-acquisitions situations. Nevertheless, in Sherman Act cases
involving horizontal or vertical integration, the Columbia Steel decision
has been and continues to be the principal authority.
In the First National Bank case, Justice Douglas, although his
majority opinion went much farther, quoted the Columbia Steel factors
(set out supra in this comment) and said that the factors, as applied
to the case at bar, compelled the conclusion that the consolidation was
illegal.17 Justices Brennan and White specially concurred in the
result but would have rested the reversal solely on the conclusion that
the Columbia Steel factors compelled reversal. Justice Harlan, joined
by Justice Stewart, dissented, arguing that the Court ignored the
factors which failed to show a real economic threat to competition
and based a decision solely on one factor-the large proportionate
share, or fifty-two percent'8 of the relevant market to be held by the
consolidated bank.
Whether the Government did in fact prove its case under the
economic factors approach is a moot question, for it seems clear that
the majority (Douglas and the four concurring without opinion), in
discussing the Columbia Steel case, was throwing a sop to the four
man minority who would rely on that case. The majority cited as
controlling authority the case of Northern Securities Company v.
United States,19 "and its progeny"2 0-United States v. Union Pacific
Company,2 1 United States v. Reading Company- and United States v.
Southern Pacific Company.23 The Court relied on these four old rail-
road cases, all decided before 1925, for a proposition of per se illegality
-that "where merging companies are major competitive factors in a
relevant market, the elimination of significant competition between
them, by merger, itself constitutes a violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act."12 4 Both banks being major competitive factors whose consolida-
tion would eliminate inter se competition, this fact, without more,
16 See United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, supra note 8, at 342,
n. 20. "Columbia Steel was repeatedly cited by Congressmen considering the
amendment of § 7 as an example of what they conceived to be the inability of
the Sherman Act, as then construed, to deal with the problems of corporate con-
centration."
17 United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co., supra note 7, at 1037.
18 Id. at 1035. This figure appears in the majority opinion.
19 193 U.S. 197 (1904).2o United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co., supra note 7, at 1036.
21226 U.S. 61 (1912).
22 253 U.S. 26 (1920).
23259 U.S. 214 (1922).
24 United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co., supra note 7, at 1037.
[Vol. 52,
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brings this case within the above proposition, and the proposition
was reiterated by Douglas as the rule of law of the case.25
Harlan's dissent emphasized that the four railroad cases relied on
by the majority had been considered in the Columbia Steel case and
had been rejected as so factually dissimilar as to offer little guidance.
The cases had not been expressly overruled, the Court saying, 'We
do not stop to examine those cases to determine whether we would
now approve either their language or their holdings."26 Harlan main-
tained that the cases were overruled sub silentio by the portion of the
Columbia Steel opinion set out supra. The consideration of all the
economic factors surrounding a consolidation is inconsistent with per
se illegality, where a court holds a combination illegal because of the
elimination of the inter se competition between the merging com-
panies, without reference to the strength or weakness of the remaining
competition. 27
To explain the majority's use of a discredited line of authority is
to deal in supposition. Nevertheless, the similarity of the burden of
proof under the rule of law in the First National Bank case to that
under section seven of the Clayton Act is strikingly obvious. Harlan
commented that the case was a "Clayton Act case masquerading in
the garb of the Sherman Act" and that the Government had been
allowed "to change horses in midstream in fact if not quite in form."28
The Sherman Act has been said to be a "charter of freedom" with "a
generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable
in constitutional provisions." 29 Moreover, in the Columbia Steel case,
Justice Reed, writing for the Court, indicated that in determining
whether a violation of the Sherman Act had occurred, the public
policy behind section seven of the Clayton Act should be taken into
account.30 Whether the Sherman Act is, or should be, able to expand
to meet any loophole left by newer antitrust legislation is beyond the
scope of this comment. Suffice it to say in this instance that the
25 Douglas did discuss testimony in the record which indicated the possible
debilatory effect of the consolidation on the remaining competitors. As pointed
out in the dissent, however, the district court had found that this particular
testimony was based on surmise and lacking in factual support (208 F. Supp. at
460), and this finding must stand unless clearly erroneous. Douglas' tentative
consideration of the effect of the consolidation on remaining competitors appears
to be part of the attempt to show the minority that illegality is compelled by the
Columbia Steel factors. The consideration of this factor is not essential to the
rule of law of the case.26 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., supra note 14, at 531.
27 United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co., supra note 7, at 1036.
28 Id. at 1041.29 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
30 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., supra note 14, at 507, n. 7. See also,
The Columbia Steel Case: New Light on Old Anti-Trust Problems, 58 Yale L.J.
764, 770-1 (1949).
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majority appears to have read this elastic element into the Act. This
was done almost as if for the particular circumstance, because the
Columbia Steel case was not overruled as consistency would dictate.
Rather it was cited and quoted approvingly by the Court.
The precedental value of the First National Bank case is for
situations involving assets acquisitions, not accompanied by merger,
by corporations not subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC. These
acquisitions were not brought within the realm of the Clayton Act
by the Philadelphia National Bank case. The Government must rely
on the Sherman Act. It is almost a certainty that both prosecutor
and prosecuted will argue that the First National Bank case compels
a decision in their favor, that the Justice Department will rely on the
rule of per se illegality, and that the defendants will rely on the
Columbia Steel factors test.
William H. Fortune
Em-Ercr DoMAw-QUALiF=G TiE NON-EXPERT WrrN~ss.-In a con-
demnation action, the property owner was permitted to testify as to
the fair market value of the property in question. The Commonwealth
moved to strike the testimony as incompetent. The motion was denied
and the jury found for the property owner in the amount of 44,000
dollars. Held: Reversed and remanded. The testimony given by the
property owner revealed no familiarity with property values in the
neighborhood and was clearly incompetent. The court went on to
say prospectively that the property owner will not be presumed com-
petent simply because he is the owner of the property in question;
that the owner must be qualified as competent before he gives an
estimate of value. Commonwealth v. Fister, 378 S.W.2d 720 (Ky.
1963).
The court in the Fister case was careful to say that it was making
only a procedural change; that under prior Kentucky law1 the property
owner was presumed competent to testify as to market value, but if it
were shown on cross examination that he was not, the testimony was
subject to motion to strike. This case has the immediate effect of
certifying the law. The prior law seemingly was in conflict as to the
status of the property owner as a witness on market value.2 Decisions
in which it was held error not to strike the owner's testimony may
1 Hipp-Green Lumber Corp. v. Potter, 271 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1954).
2 See generally 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 545(8): "Although there is some
authority to the contrary it is generally held that the owner of realty is competent
to testify as to its value; and his estimate is received although his knowledge on
the subject is not such as would qualify him to testify if he were not the owner."
[Vol. 52,
